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FOREWORD 
This is the first reliable account in English, so 
far published, of the recent military operations 
around Shanghai. It has been compiled from official 
data kindly furnished by the Press Section of the 
War Office. While heartily deploring the terrible 
loss of life and the unspeakable sufferings of body 
and soul which the clash of arms has necessarily 
entailed, one fortunately finds in the story of the 
campaili!n some features that call forth feelings 
of more pleasing character. 
Speaking, for instance, from a national point 
of view, we may say, without any intention of 
boasting, that our heart glows with pride and 
thankfulness to see from incontestable evidence 
that our people have not lost their traditional traits 
of heroic bravery and self-sacrificing patriotism 
which have made Japan what she is now among 
the great nations of the world. 
Nor are we less willing to bear witness to the 
great power of resistance and fine esprit de corps 
so abundantly shown by the Chinese forces pitted 
against ours. Without meaning any discourtesy to 
our continental neighbours, we may say this was a 
revelation not to ourselves alone but to the whole 
world. It has shown once more-for this is by no 
means the first time the world has had the chance 
to learn the same lesson-that the Chinese, contrary 
to a generally accepted theory in recent years, are 
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far from deficient in qualities needed for the make 
up of the first class soldiers. It is only training 
and organization that will be required for making 
them into a formidable military power. 
We are pleased to pay this homage to the 
Chinese people, because we are convinced that the 
emergence of a sufficiently large army composed 
of strong men like those led by General Tsai Ting-
kai, is one of the essential conditions for the 
unification of China. 
There is another reason why we are pleased 
with the unexpected display of courage and strength 
by the Chinese. It is almost a truism to say that 
there can be no true and lasting friendship unless 
it rests upon the rock of mutual respect. This is 
true of nations even more than of individuals. 
The prospect of a strong and well-armed China 
will necessarily give rise to reflections of a decidedly 
disquieting tenor. But after taking all things into 
consideration, we are persuaded to believe that a 
stronger and more self-reliant China will conduce 
to the establishment of happier and more endurable 
relations between her and Japan. 
But all these considerations apart, we owe it 
to ourselves and to the sense of fairness to offer 
China our unstinted recognition of the good account 
her fighters have given of themselves at Shanghai. 
MOTOSADA ZUMOTO 
Tokyo, May, 1932. 
FIGHTINGS AROUND 
SHANGHAI 
I. The Start of the Military Expedition 
The Imperial naval force, which was landed 
at Shanghai upon the outbreak of the trouble there, 
to protect some 30,000 Japanese residents and their 
property, was to find itself confronted by a Chinese 
army numbering more than ten times as large as 
itself. Our naval men, in their continuous struggle 
against such tremendous odds, had to fight under 
extremely trying conditions, day and night, with 
little rest or sleep. Inspite of such efforts, however, 
the situation in Shanghai went from bad to worse, 
plunging our resident population into a state of 
unbearable uncertainty and danger. But there being 
a limit to the number to be drawn upon the Navy 
for service ashore, the Government decided early 
in February to despatch, with Imperial sanction, a 
military force to Shanghai to assure the safety of 
our residents there and also to perform our inter-
national duties of guarding the Settlement. 
There was organized an expeditionary army 
with the Ninth Division as its main body. In ad-
dition a mixed brigade was despatched from the 
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Twelfth Division. The latter force, for the time 
being placed under the Commander of the Third 
Squadrop later to be put under the Commander of 
the Ninth Division upon his landing in Shanghai, 
boarded vessels of the Second Squadron and left 
Sasebo at 11 a.m. on February 6. In the following 
afternoon these men began to make a landing at a 
point some 3,000 kilometres south of Woosungchen. 
Towards 5.30 p.m. the first-line troops were advanced 
on the southern side of Woosungchen to face across 
the creek a hostile force garrisoning the Woosung 
forts, while our main force was concentrated near 
the railway station. After a survey of the field, 
it was decided for tactical reasons to suspend tbe 
offensive movement for the time being, and keep a 
watch on the opposing line. 
The Ninth Division began to board ships at 
Ujina on February 9. The first portion, under cover 
of the bombardment made by the convoying ships 
for restraining the forts, proceeded past Woosung 
in the evening of February 13. A portion of these 
troops was taken to the railway wharf south of 
Woosungchen, while the main body was brought 
up to the wharf in Shanghai. 
First Statement by Commander of the Ninth Division 
Lieutenant-General Uyeda, Commander of the 
Ninth Division, upon his arrival at Shanghai, issued 
prior to :his landing a statement which rendered 
into English reads as follows : 
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"I have this day arrived here charged with the 
duties of safeguarding the subjects of our Empire 
resident in and about Shanghai. The provocative 
Chinese attitude toward our landing party has placed 
the Settlement in a state of danger and uncertainty. 
Our nationals are now subject to extremely trying 
conditions of life. In directing the action of the 
Division under my command, I intend to cooperate 
with our Navy and save our nationals from their 
present difficulty with the least delay. While it is 
our aim to attain our object as peacefully as 
possible, any interference with the action of our 
Division will be disposed of promptly and with 
decision. With regard to the Powers with which 
we are to work, we shall aim at a friendly co· 
operation in our efforts to rescue the Settlement 
from the present menaces. As for the general 
populace of China who will offer no interference 
with our Division or its performance of duties, we 
are ready, being aware of their difficulty well 
deserving of sympathy, to show full regard for the 
peaceful tenor of their lives." 
The Ninth Division began to land its first 
contingent at 7 a.m. on February 14. A part of 
these troops was stationed at a Chinese village 
about 6 kilometres east of Kiangwanchen, while the 
main body was quartered in the Japanese factories 
in Yangshupu, an eastern section of the International 
Settlement. On the following day, February 15, a 
portion of its forces, replacing the landing party, 
took over the guard of North Szechuan Road. The 
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second contingent, arriving a the wharf in th-.. 
morning of February 16, comp ~~ed it lanJing the 
same day. 
II. What was Done to A vert Hostilities 
The Ninth Division thus completed its concen-
tration near Shanghai by February 16; but being 
still hopeful of an amicable settlement, the Com-
mander caused his Chief of Staff to arrange an 
interview with the Chief of Staff of the ineteenth 
Route Army. At this meeting our advice was 
offered as to possible means of effecting a peaceful 
settlement. The conference, however, disclo ed a 
wide divergence of views, and our sugg tions, 
which were offered in a spirit of fairness, failed to 
win a favourable response. The Commander of the 
Ninth Division, still reluctant to forego his hope of 
settling the si uation by means other than arm , 
addressed on F bruary 18 at 9 p.m. a note to the 
Commander of the ineteenth Route Army, asl ing 
for his reconsideration. 
General Uyeda's Note to the Commander of 
Nineteenth Route Army 
The Note which Lieutenant-General Uyeda ad-
dre sed on the same occasion was to the following 
effect: 
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" Being most earnestly desirous of performing 
by peaceful means the dut ies I am charged with, I 
wish to submit the following with the hope that it 
may meet with your favourable consideration : 
" (1) You will at once cease hostilities, complet-
ing the evacuation of your first line by 7 a.m. in 
the morning of February 20. Your army will then 
withdraw by 5 p.m. in the afternoon of February 20 
to areas, excluding the Lion Hill Forts and 20 kilo-
metres from the boundary line of the International 
Settlement as follows: in the area lying on the west 
side of the Whangpoo, to the northward of the line to 
be drawn from T saochiatuchen at the northwestern 
point of the International Settlement to Chouchia-
chiaochen and Pusungchen ; and in the area lying on 
the east side of the Whangpoo River, to the northward 
of the line from Lannitu to Changchialouchen, a line 
largely running through the heart of Shanghai from 
east to west. The forts and other military works 
within the designated ar as should be removed not 
to be replaced by new preparations. 
" (2) The Japanese army will make no shoot-
ing, bombing, or movement in pursuit, excepting re-
connoitring by aeroplane, after your army have 
begun to withdraw. Upon evacuation of your army 
the Japanese army will confine itself to the mainte-
nance in Honiikew of the area about the street on 
which the Municipal Cou:1cil building is placed, 
including the locality round Hongkew Park. 
" (3) Upon the complete withdrawal of your 
first-line troops, the Japanese army will despatch 
under armed guard a committee of investigation to 
go over the evacuated area. The same committee 
will carry the Japanese national flag for identification. 
"(4) Your army will offer full protection to the 
lives and property of Japanese nationals resident near 
Shanghai outside the above areas of evacuation. In 
case such protection should fail, the Japanese army 
will take such measures as may be considered pro-
per. Your army will also put an effective stop to 
all activities of the plain-clothes soldiers. 
" (5) As for the protection of foreign residents, 
other than Japanese, around Shanghai, including the 
above areas of evacuation, negotiation shall be made 
on some future occasion. 
" (6) With regard to the suppression of anti-
Japanese activities, the pledge given by Mayor Wu 
to Consul-General Murai on January 28 must be 
strictly put into effect. 
" On this point the Japanese diplomatic officials 
will approach your civil authorities in Shanghai for 
separate negotiation. 
" In case the foregoing points fail to be carried 
out, the Japanese army will be obliged to take free 
action against your army which should hold itself 
responsible for whatever consequences." 
Commaoder of the Nineteenth Route Army Repliea 
Replying to the above note, General Tsai Ting-
kai, Commander of the Nineteenth Route Army, sent 
a note at 8.15 p.m. on February 19, which ran 1n 
substance as below : 
" We beg to acknowledge receipt of your note 
despatched at 9 p.m. on February 18. Our army, 
being responsible directly to the National Govern· 
ment, holds itself subject only to its order. We 
have reported the points contained in your com-
munication to the National Government which, we 
trust, will transmit its reply directly to your Minister 
through the Foreign Department. While I am as 
yet in receipt of no official instruction, the National 
Government, according to Rengo news, has instruct-
ed Commander Tsai and Mayor Wu to reply to you 
to the following effect : 
" (1) The Chinese army will withdraw to 20 
kilometres from the boundary line of the Interna-
tional Settlement : 
." (2) The Japanese army will likewise withdraw 
20 kilometres : 
" (3) As regards the permanent disarmament 
of the forts at Woosung and Paoshan, we refuse to 
comply with the Japanese proposal." 
In such circumstances the Commander of the 
Ninth Division was obliged to conclude that the 
Chinese had no intention of agreeing to his pro-
posal, and decided to follow the only course now 
open to him. 
I 
II 
8 
III. Topographical Features of Shanghai 
Region and Conditions of the 
Enemy's Forces 
(A) Topographical Features 
The country round Shanghai, which is a level 
plain made of the sandy mud carried down by the 
Yangtze, forms a veritable canal zone with Kiang-
wan Canal, Woosung Creek, Whangpoo River and 
hundreds of other creeks running in all directions 
between lakes and rivers. There are great facilities 
for water transport ; but as for land traffic and es-
pecially roads over any speakable distance, there 
are absolutely no paths except those made along 
the wider creeks or canals used by men towing 
boats. The minor creeks are spanned at places by 
bridges hardly negotiable by anything heavier than 
cattle. Besides, these waterways are such that 
soldiers could never wade through by foot, and, 
therefore, form very serious obstacles to movement 
of organized forces. Military operations under such 
conditions were by necessity hampered to a very 
serious degree. 
What is more, the towns in the neighbourhood 
of Shanghai are encircled by heavy brick walls 
which proved not only unclimbable but even formed 
effective barricades against field artillery fire. Smaller 
villages, though without such walls as a rule, are 
in many instances girdled by waterways. These 
villages generally have no defence work to guard 
the whole communal areas, but there are walls built 
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by family groups which live closely together behind 
them for self-protection. These walls offered con-
siderable facilities for resisting the offensive fire. 
(B) Conditions of the Enemy Forces 
The Chinese force which the Ninth Division 
upon its landing had to face at the front was the 
Nineteenth Route Army, commanded by Tsai Ting-
kai, which roughly consisted of the following :-
Soldiers and arms 60th Div. 6lst Div. 78th Div. Total 
Number of soldiers 11,000 12,500 10,000 33,500 
Number of rifles 9,000 10,500 8,000 27,500 
Machine guns 24 28 20 72 
Mountain artillery 8 10 6 24 
Trench mortars 10 20 10 40 
No~ :-Each Division consists of 6 Tuan, one Tuan corresponding 
to one Japanese regiment. 
It may also be noted that the main forces of 
the Guard Divisions at Nanking and Hangchow 
were at the time still placed at Sungkiang, Nanhsiang, 
Kunshan and also westward of these places. The 
dispositions of these troops were as shown in 
Chart I. 
With regard to these enemy positions, further 
,I 
I 
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details mentioned below were learned as a result of 
open hostilities. 
The construction of the enemy's positions near 
Shanghai had been started before February 12. It 
was apparently planned from the start that Kiang-
wanchen and Miaohsiangchen should form the first 
line of defence. The Chinese positions at the former 
town and northward were each constructed strongly 
with a village as its basis and effectively guarded 
on the flanks by a series of strong emplacements 
for machine guns. These preparations may further 
be described as follows : 
(1) Shelter Trenches 
These trenches consisted of standing fire trenches 
with traverses and also of double bottomed trenches 
which were not of uniform strength. As a rule the 
trenches were narrow but fairly deep, occasionally 
lightly sheltered by wooden boards or panels, and 
iron sheets. 
(2) Covered Machine Gun Emplacements · 
The machine gun emplacements were generally 
covered. The protective covers were fairly strongly 
built with thin iron sheets and brick. The mounds 
or Chinese graves, wherever found, were utilized for 
defensive purposes. Concrete and brick buildings 
were seldom overlooked, not a few of them being 
provided with loopholes. 
(3) Outer Trenches · 
The outer trenches before the enemy's positions 
generally seemed to ha 'le been made by utilizing 
waterways. At some points d'appui there were 
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formed special outer trenches 4 metres wide at the 
top and 2 metres deep. 
(4) Barricades, etc. 
Points d'appui were invariably guarded by light 
wire entanglements made by use of standing trees, 
wooden beams of houses and so forth joined by a 
network of barbed wire. These were mostly built to 
a depth of about 4 metres, some of them being 
movable. Palisades were also seen at some places. 
(5) Armour-Sheltered Positions 
As for positions protected by armour, there was 
nothing specially noteworthy except those with light 
protective covers of iron for use of commanding 
officers. ' • 
IV. Offensive about Kiangwanchen 
(See Accompanying Chari) 
What should particularly be noted about the 
present operations is that the Japanese army, in the 
first place, openly set the date for commencement 
of its general offensive, thus sacrificing tactical ad· 
vantages, and, in the second, it directed its action 
by only frontal attacks. These tactical moves were 
deliberately chosen, despite the obvious disadvan· 
tages, in consideration of serious eventualities other· 
wise likely to involve the other Powers in Shanghai. 
If, for instance, attack was made on the enemy's 
ftank from the north, his force might have fallen 
back in disorder into the International Settlement 
to imperil the civilian population there. Opera· 
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tions from the southern side were likewise out of 
the question because of the existence of the French 
Concession. The Japanese forces in the circumstances 
were obliged to fight under the worst given condi-
tions. 
(A) Fighting on February 20 
At 7 a.m. on February 20 the Chinese first line 
showed no signs of withdrawal, but even displayed 
their hostile disposition by firing upon our aero-
planes. Nor had the National Government sent its 
reply. The Ninth Division, therefore, launched its 
offensive action at 7.30 a.m. with its troops disposed 
as below: 
The Woosung Detachment (two infantry com-
panies as unit). 
Placed south of W oosungchen ; this detach-
ment covered the rear of the right flank of 
the Division. 
The Mixed Brigade (less the Woosung Detach· 
ment). 
By advancing through the area southwest 
of Woosung, this brigade directed its action 
againt the enemy's positions northwest of 
Kiangwanchen. 
The Right Column (6 infantry battalions and 
one battalion of mountain artillery as unit). 
This column attacked the enemy about 
Kiangwanchen from the east side. 
The Central Column (approximately 4 battalions 
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of infantry and one battalion of mountain artillery 
as unit). 
This force attacked the enemy to the south 
of Kiangwanchen. 
The Left Column (the landing party as unit). 
These troops held their positions in Chapei, 
keeping watch over the opposing front. 
Field Artillery and Aerial Force. 
In the earlier stages of fighting these forces 
chiefly cooperated with the Right Column. 
The Third Naval Squadron at the same time co-
operated with the Ninth Division in support of the 
Woosung Detachment by bombardment of certain 
strategic points and manoeuvring in the direction 
of Liuhochen. 
Our first-line troops continued to move forward 
at each point, by driving off small enemy forces on 
their way, until they reached at 10 a.m. the line 
from north to south of the Kiangwan race course. 
Then our Right Column routed the enemy force, two 
to three thousand strong, occupying the strong r.osi-
tions along a line from north to south of the eastern 
side of Kiangwanche~. A portion of this column 
entered the same town at 1 p.m. 
Toward the evening the Mixed Brigade in the 
right wing advanced to the northwest of Kiangwan-
chen, reaching the line of Peisungchai, Chinfengchai, 
and Maochiachai. The main body of our Division 
had in the meantime moved eastward from the areas 
north of Kiangwanchen along the railway line, until 
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it advanced to a line on the east side of Fangpin, 
1 kilometre south of Kiangwan. 
By midnight of the same day it had been learn-
ed that the enemy's first line occupied the fortified 
positions on a line extending from near Miaohsiang 
to the neighbourhood of the North Station, Shang-
hai, across the creeks on the west side of Kiangwan-
chen. A hostile force placed in the centre of 
Kiangwanchen was still offering stubborn resist-
ance. There was a massed force of Chinese in the 
neighbourhood of Tachangchen. The areas about 
Woosungchen were still held by the enemy. It was 
also learned that the enemy's second line of posi-
tions was placed along a line from north to south 
touching at the east end of Tachangchen, while his 
third line, close behind, on a north to south line 
running at the western end of the same town. In 
the light of such knowledge the Commander of the 
Division transferred the main body of the Central 
Column to the area between the Right Column and 
the Mixed Brigade, in preparation for the operations 
of next day. He also made the following changes 
in dispositions of our forces:-
The Woosung Detachment. 
This was to continue its duties as before. 
The 24th Mixed Brigade. 
Prepared for the offensive against the enemy 
force in front. 
The Right Column (approximately 3 battalions 
of infantry and one battalion of mountain artillery 
as unit). 
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This body prepared for its offensive by 
advancing to a line extending southward 
from Paiyangtsun to Sunchiachai and beyond. 
The Left Column (approximately 6 battalions of 
infantry and one battalion of mountain artillery as 
unit). 
Prepared for the offensive against the 
enemy at Kiangwanchen and northward. 
One Infantry Battalion. 
Prepared for the offensive against the 
enemy south of Kiangwanchen. 
The Main Force of Field Artillery. 
This was placed near the Kiangwan Race 
Course chiefly to act in cooperation with 
the Right Column. 
The Landing Party. 
Was to guard its present positions. 
The Reserve Force (approximately 2 battalions 
of infantry). 
This was stationed on the east side of the 
Kiangwan Race Course. 
(B) Fighting on February 21. 
At 8 a.m. on February 21 our Division opened 
action with artillery fire, to be followed by assaults 
on the enemy at Kiangwanchen. 
About 9.30 a.m. the enemy forces in the centre 
of Kiangwanchen began to show signs of wavering 
under our fire. A part of our Left Column was 
then charged with the task of clearing the enemy 
from the streets, while the rest advanced on two 
' ! 
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sides of the streets, moving forward along a north 
to south line at the western end of the town. 
In the evening of February 21 the enemy 
firmly held their ground from near Chichialiu, 
about 6 kilometres northward from the west end of 
Kiangwanchen, to the eastern ends of Siwan and 
Miaohsiang, and southwardly, to the villages along 
a small creek running from north to south at 
the western extremity of Kiangwanchen. Our first 
line closely pressed against these positions. 
(C) Fighting on February 22 
At daybreak our Division started operations 
against the enemy's positions north of Kiangwan-
chen. At 6.40 a.m. or thereabout the 24th Mixed 
Brigade captured the hostile positions in the neigh-
bourhood of Miaohsiang; and later, broke through 
the opposing line extending northward from How-
kuochiachai, about 600 metres north of the western 
end of Kiangwanchen. But what with a number 
of plain-clothes soldiers now overriding the field of 
battle, demanding our serious attention, and a series 
of creeks and narrow paths impeding our progress, 
considerable difficulty was experienced in employing 
our troops to full advantage. Our progress for the 
day was as far as the lines described below, a por-
tion of our troops being posted in Kiangwan and 
southwestward to keep a watch over the enemy's 
positions. 
Main Body of the 24th Mixed Brigade : near 
the western point of Miaohsiang. 
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Right Column: at the western end of Maochia-
chai and Pusi. 
Left Column: near Shouchiashe and Shunchiachai. 
Main Force of Mountain Artillery: near Liang-
yinchai north of Kiangwanchen. 
Main Force of Field and Heavy Artillery : near 
Kiangwan Race Course. 
The defeated enemy soldiers stopped in the 
villages close before our line. 
As a result of the day's engagements near 
Miaohsiang, it was definitely ascertained that 
the 18th Guard Division under Chiang Kai-
shek had joined the Chinese first-line. 
At midnight on February 22 an enemy force of 
about 3 battalions made an assault on the rear of 
the right flank of our 24th Mixed Brigade at Nan· 
sunchai and eastward. The assailants, however, 
were repulsed with heavy damage. The same night 
also saw a series of counter-attacks north of Chapei 
and bombardments by Chinese artillery, which were 
in each case overcome. 
It was also in the course of this day's fighting 
that three Japanese privates met with their end in 
a manner that was to be acclaimed by the whole 
nation as mirroring national heroism of the highest 
order. Below is a brief account of the same incident. 
The enemy's positions about Miaohsiang were 
well protected as the mainstay of his left wing. 
No less than a score of days must have been spent 
on their preparation. Protected by a system of 
barbed wire and outer trenches, they really presented 
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propositions of considerable difficulty. Besides, the 
wire entanglements happened to have escaped the 
punishment of our artillery fire. It became neces· 
sary in the circumstances that our engineers should 
undertake to open up paths through these areas of 
wire entanglements for the charge of infantry men 
which was set for an early morning hour of Feb-
ruary 22. It was therefore planned to accomplish 
it by improvising for the purpose long explosive 
tubes, on which work was started in the evening 
of February 21. 
A small squad of engineers, to whom the task 
of breaking down the wire entanglements had been 
given, made arrangements with the infantry troops 
which were to charge through the opened paths. 
These engineers then betook themselves close to 
their objective points about 5 a.m. and waited for 
the appointed time. In early hours of the seventeenth 
day of the lunar month, the moon was still out, 
though more often veiled by morning mists. So 
they could command a view to a distance of not 
more than 30 or so metres ahead. 
The explosive squad under Sergeant Umada 
was divided into three parties each of three men. 
Intending to complete their work of destruction in 
.the dark, they put up a smoke screen under cover 
of which they crawled on. But they had not ap-
proached within 30 or so metres from their objective 
when their presence was discovered. A heavy 
fusillade was poured upon them. But our m,en 
hurled themselves forward in their resolute attempt. 
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They were all killed or disabled. Whereupon the 
task of destruction fell upon the second squad under 
Corporal Uchida which had been holding itself in 
reserve. Private Sakue's first party and Private 
Kitamura's second party each prepared for their 
duties. It was plain that the enemy, now well on 
their guard, would give them no time to ignite the 
explosive after placing it in the entanglement. 
These men, therefore, decided to drive the explosive 
home in a way which, counting all chances of 
success in their favour, still meant their own 
destruction as sure as that of the entanglements. 
Having ignited the fuse, they carried the heavy 
explosive tube between them and ran for the wire 
entanglement. The second party of Private Kita-
mura managed to withdraw itself to some distance 
in time. The first party of Private Sakue and two 
others, however, with no thought of withdrawal, 
carried on their duties until their end. Corporal 
Uchida in command was also wounded. Thus there 
were opened up two passages, each about 10 metres 
wide. Sergeant Umada, in command of the first 
squad, who had sent his three parties with unsuc-
cessful results, now leaped forth and hurled more 
than a dozen of hand grenades upon the enemy 
line. In the moments of confusion thus created he 
rushed single-handed into the wire defence and cut 
open a passage by means of hand shears. Three 
pathways thus having been made, the infantry 
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charged through to capture a sector of the Miaoh-
siang line. 
(D) Fighting on February 23-24 (Chart m 
A tactical change was now thought advisadle in 
the light of the experience gained during the past 
few days. The enemy, in fortifying their positions, 
seemed to have overlooked no creek, village or 
dwelling house of any strategic value. At each 
important point a barricade of one sort or another 
had been put up. In consideration of these points 
and also our numerical strength put into play, the 
Ninth Division decided to drop the idea of making 
operations on the general line at the same time. 
They decided on a new line of tactics in which our 
bombardment, especially from the air and by heavy 
artillery, after full preparation on well elaborated 
schemes, was to be concentrated on the enemy's 
strategic points one after another until a complete 
destruction should be wrought all along and the 
field opened up for more extensive and freer 
operations. On the two days February 23- 24 our 
troops generally remained at their positions of the 
previous night, making preparations for the proposed 
offensive. 
The enemy, however, made around sunset on 
February 23 counter attacks against the front of 
our Mixed Brigade and the front of our Left Column. 
About 8.30 p.m. they attacked the neighbourhood 
of the radio station of the Divisional Headquarters. 
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These sectional counter-attacks were repulsed in 
each instance. 
From the information in hand from various 
sources, it was gathered that the enemy's positions 
at this stage were roughly as shown in Chart II. 
(E) Fighting from February 25 to 29 
On February 25 our Division launched the 
second general offensive. The 24th Mixed Brigade 
was charged to maintain the captured positions 
about Miaohsiangchen. The Right Column was the 
first to start action, opening the fire at 6.30 a.m. by 
heavy artillery and from the air, concentrating it 
upon the enemy line in front. At 10 a.m. these 
forces captured the hostile positions to the north 
and south of Chinchiachiang. By this time the 
enemy line to our south or to the southwest of 
Kiangwanchen, began to waver with some numbers 
already in retreat to the west. Our Division then 
had its artillery fire concentrated upon the enemy 
in and about Howkuochiachai and Tsienkuochiachai 
in front of our Left Column, which had by 4 p.m. 
completely captured the enemy's positions in these 
areas. 
The routed enemy ranks were being concentrated 
at Erhshihsanyuan, a point about 2 kilometres 
northwest of Kiangwan, when a force of Inspecting 
Soldiers or "shock troops in the rear," who are 
charged to encourage or punish the soldiers of 
their own side in retreat, happened to appear on 
the scene on their eastern advance. These two 
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groups had an armed clash the while our aeroplanes 
and artillery went on to inflict heavy damage upon 
them. However, the ruthless barrier set up by the 
Shock Troops in the rear at least had the effect of 
causing the routed soldiers to heel about and advance 
eastward for the recovery of their lost positions. 
These men reappeared before the villages now in 
our hands. But almost completely demoralized, they 
were no longer capable of brisk action. Of the 
enemy force, too, which had been offering a stubborn 
resistance from within Kianwanchen, some began to 
retaeat toward 4 p.m. 
On the other hand, fresh enemy troops began 
to move forward about noon from two directions, 
one from the west, and the other from Lotienchen, 
both proceeding towards Tachangchen. 
During the offensive of this day the Navy ac· 
corded very effective aid. Cooperation between our 
infantry and artillery likewise being effected to 
satisfaction, our .men succeeded in wresting all of 
the objective positions from the enemy. Though 
we were unable to develop our fighting capacity to 
the full for numerical and topographical reasons, 
our army this day inflicted on the hostile line damage 
of serious material and moral significance.' 
On the following day, February 26, at 6.20 a.m., 
a company under Sub-Lieutenant Wakabayashi, of 
the Seventh Infantry Regiment, made a surprise 
attack at Yenchiachia, on the northwest side of 
Kiangwan. By an adroit movement at a dead angle 
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of their arms, these men succeeded in 'capturing the 
Chinese position, guarded by four machine guns. 
At 2.10 p.m. on February 27 our Division oc-
cupied the western end of Kiangwanchen, thus 
taking the whole enemy line extending from Miao-
hsiangchen to the western end of Kiangwanchen. 
Our work was now to be directed to preparation 
for the offensive against the enemy's second line 
near Tachangchen. 
· V. Our Army Reinforced 
At the time of despatching the Ninth Division 
to Shanghai there was no knowing as to the 
attitude of Chinese troops other than the Nineteenth 
Route Army. It was not until February 22 that it 
was ascertained as a result of engagements that 
the enemy's ranks had considerably been swelled 
by addition of the Guard Divisions under Chiang 
Kai-shek. Now taking into reckoning the topo-
graphical elements to be overcome and the numerical 
strength of our side, the existing situation suggested 
possibilities of our Division coming to a deadlock on 
the field of battle. A speedy reinforcement was 
plainly necessary in order to dispose of the Chinese 
opposition for an early settlement of the situation. 
It was therefore arranged to form an expeditionary 
army in the Shanghai region by addition of the 
Eleventh and Fourteenth Divisions, together with 
some special forces from elsewhere. General 
Y oshinori Shirakawa was placed in command of 
I I 
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this army. The transportation of these reinforce-
ments was prepared with the least possible delay. 
The Commander of the expeditionary army, 
accompanied by his staff, sailed from the home 
waters on February 27. Arriving at the mouth of 
the Yangtze on February 29, he effected arrange-
ments for the Naval cooperation for the landing of 
the troops. The Commander, taking all the circum-
stances into consideration, deemed delay impermis-
sible. A general ' offensive was set for the next day, 
March 1, and instructions were issued accordingly. 
The Ninth Division was ordered to advance, accord-
ing to its prearranged plans, to a line from near 
Changchiachiao, west of Miaohsiangchen, to Hsima-
wan about 2 kilometres to the south of Kiangwan-
chen via Tahsingchiao, some 2 kilometres west of 
Kiangwanchen. The main body of the Eleventh 
Division, freshly arriving, was to make a landing 
early in the morning of March 1 on the shore of 
the Yangtze in a northwesterly direction of Liuho-
chen, with the instruction to take possession of the 
last named place with the least possible delay so 
as to be in readiness for later offensive moves on 
Tachangan and Chenju. 
General Shirakawa, the Commander, landing at 
Shanghai at 1 p.m. on March 1, at once issued a 
statement. 
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Commander Shirakawa's Statement 
"I have this day arrived in Shanghai in com-
mand of the expeditionary forces and charged with 
duties of according protection to the Japanese 
residents in and about Shanghai, in cooperation 
with the Imperial Navy. 
"Japan's solicitous efforts to make an amicable 
settlement of things has met with no success. 
Since our Ninth Division was called forth for armed 
operations, the Chinese have been increasing their 
military preparations, leaving no doubt as to their 
determination on armed action. Our Empire under 
the circumstances is compelled to make such an 
increase in its expeditionary forces as necessary 
for the attainment of its original objects. However, 
being without hostile designs and solicitous to 
avoid any unnecessary complications, our army is 
ready to suspend hostilities at any time, if the 
Chinese withdraw their army, in compliance with 
our request. 
" As for the civil population of China, we shall 
show them due regards as our friendly neighbours. 
Regarding the nationals of other Powers, we shall, 
needless to say, remain in friendly harmony with 
them, showing full respect for their rights and 
interests. 
"Upon my arrival in Chinese territory in 
command of the Imperial army, I declare, in pursuance 
of our present object, my intention that our warlike 
operations will be confined within the least 
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possible area, with always in view an early restora-
tion of orderly conditions, so as to ensure the 
safety of our nationals and restoration of peace in 
the Far East. 
March 1, 1932. 
General Yoshinori Shirakawa, 
Commander of the Expeditionary 
Army to Shanghai 
VI. Operations in Liuho, Tachangchen 
and Thereabout 
(See Chart Ill) 
(A) Positions of the Chinese Armies Prior to Adion 
The Chinese troops were generally disposed as 
shown in Chart II, except the 60th and 61st 
Divisions which Tsai Ting·kai had concentrated 
near Tachangchen, evidently determined to hold 
the second line there at all costs. At the first line 
in the area of Chapei a great number of volunteers 
had been placed, while the 89th Division had been 
distributed in the rear toward Chiating and 
Nanhsiang. 
The Nineteenth Route Army had originally been 
full of spirit, with fairly good fighting capacity. 
When, however, the number of casualties steadily 
mounted they became more and more demoralized. 
Soldiers of the Guard Divisions who had had but 
little experience in actual warface were heavily 
punished by our fire from the first hour of their 
appearance at the front. The damage was so heavy 
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that these men were soon to lose their fighting 
spirit. Besides, their clash with the " shock troops 
in the rear" from the Nineteenth Route Army at 
Erhshihsanyuan on February 25 caused a fatal 
discord between the leaders of these two armies. 
The attitude of the Nineteenth Route Army men 
parading themselves as the only laurel·winners in 
the fight were also the cause of an eventual collapse 
of their solidarity. Besides, the Chinese soldiers 
took after February 28 to looting and plundering in 
the neighbourhood of their quartering places. At 
Tachangchen and Woosungchen the whole villages 
seemed to have been sacked. 
What with the pressure given by our army and 
internal discords and trouble, the Chinese, when 
informed of our reinforcements, felt that further 
fighting would be futile. The Chief of Staff of the 
Nineteenth Route Army and Wellington Koo notified 
us on February 28 through the British Naval Com· 
mand that, "if the Japanese would withdraw within 
the International Settlement the Chinese army was 
ready to evacuate beyond 20 kilometres." The same 
day Wu Tieh·cheng, the Mayor of Shanghai, like· 
wise had a message of a similar purport conveyed 
to us by Yin Chao-chen. The Chinese first line 
nevertheless went on fighting, showing no signs of 
withdrawal. 
On February 29 Wang Chin-wei (Wang Chao· 
ming) sent us a messenger bearing a proposal for 
withdrawal of both armies, who, however, emphatic-
ally stated that "the voluntary evacuation of the 
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Chinese troops as stated by Wellington Koo would 
never accord with the will of the people. The 
Nationalist Government would consider nothing 
short of the evacuation of both armies on terms of 
equality." 
(B) Fighting on March 1 
The Ninth Division, including the 24th Mixed 
Brigade, and reinforced with three infantry battalions 
from the Eleventh Division landed the previous day, 
resumed action early this morning. Placing the 
fresh troops between its two regiments, the Division 
directed its attack on the line between Miaohsiang 
and ·Kiangwan. The situation generally turning 
favourably, our men captured the enemy's positions 
about 4 kilometres in front and 2 kilometres in 
depth. At the close of the day our first line was 
advanced to the line of Miaohsiangchen, Tienyuan, 
Ssuchetou and southwards. In course of these 
engagements, Colonel Hayashi, commander of the 
Seventh Infantry Regiment, was killed in action about 
1 p.m., while assaulting a point to the west of 
Kiangwanchen. 
On the same night the Ninth Division advanced 
all along the front, reaching the line of Paoyuhsiang, 
500 metres northwest of Miaohsiangchen ; Huchia-
wan, to the west of Miaohsiang ; Tahsingchiao; 
Maochiahsiang ; Yangchiachai, 3 kilometres to the 
southwest of Kiangwanchen. 
The main body of the Eleventh Division, receiv-
ing a close cooperation from the Navy, began to 
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make a landing at 6 a.m. on March 1 in the face 
of the enemy's machine guns. The hostile force in 
this region consisted of about one battalion. The 
landing place was guarded by a Chinese force, 
about 100 strong and equipped with 3 machine guns. 
However, our troops were completely landed during 
the forenoon with no more casualties than one 
engineer officer and private killed. These forces 
started their southward march after noon to come 
at 1 p.m. to a clash with the enemy at Chien-
chingying which was taken at 5 p.m. 
The destruction by our navy of the Woosung 
fortress at the mouth of the Whangpoo gave material 
help to the transportation of our military forces. 
When the Twenty-Second Regiment of Infantry and a 
small force to fill up the Twenty-fourth Mixed Brigade 
were landed at Woosung, the Chinese were misled 
to think that the main body of our reinforcements 
was first to be concentrated at this point, and their 
attention was consequently diverted in these direc-
tions. When, therefore, a portion of the Eleventh 
Division was landed up the Yangtze, the Chinese 
forces were given a surprise, and turned in rout. 
The region selected for the above landing was 
swept by a violent northwesterly wind during the 
night. Rough waters gave promise of difficulties of 
landing. But just before the time set for the landing 
the wind turned to the south, a dead calm settling 
over the Yangtze water. Under these favourable 
conditions and with a perfect aid of the Navy, our 
military forces were able to effect such a successful 
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landing in the face of the enemy as has seldom been 
recorded in the military annals of the world. 
(C) Fihgting on March 2 
The Ninth Division resumed action early this 
morning, and advanced to a line north to south of 
Tachangchen. The enemy retreated in a rout all 
along the front. Making unbroken pursuit, the 
Ninth Division advanced at 4.30 p.m. to the line of 
W anchai, 3 kilometres north west of Tachangchen ; 
Laojenliu, about 2 kilometres west of Tachangchen; 
Chunghsiang, about 1 kilometre south of the same 
town; Sanchili, to the south of the same; Wang-
chiachai, about 2 kilometres west of the Chenju 
Rpilway station. Later toward sunset our first-line 
forces advanced as far as Hsiaonanhsiang, about 
1,500 metres northeast of Nanhsiang and Chenju. 
Our landing force in Chapei also swung into 
pursuit of the enemy. 
The main force of the Eleventh Division, starting 
from near Chienching early in the morning, advanced 
on Liuhochen which was taken by 4.30 p m. It then 
went on in pursuit of the enemy toward Chiating. 
Throughout these engagements, the air forces of 
our Army and Navy operated in full and effective 
cooperation with the troops on land, assailing the 
enemy in retreat at many points, and carrying out 
their destructive work to the full. 
(D) Fighting on March 3 
The Ninth Division this day reformed its ranks 
by concentrating its main portion at Nanhsiang, 
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and a portion at Chenju. The Eleventh Division 
turned in the afternoon on the enemy at Chiating 
from two sides, directing its main force forward 
from the direction of Loutang, and another portion, 
which had been landed south of Woosung, from the 
direction of Nanhsiang. These troops took the same 
town at 5.30 p.m. 
Early this morning men of our ]anding party, 
supported by an infantry force, effected a ]anding in 
front of the Woosung fortress and took it by 
assault. 
In the afternoon of March 5 the Commander of 
the Expeditionary Army issued an order to his 
troops to suspend action so long as the Chinese 
should refrain from hostilities, and to remain in the 
present positions. 
The Statement by General Shirakawa 
"The Imperial Army, in concert with the Im-
perial nava] forces, made every effort to discharge 
the duties of protecting the Japanese nationals 
through pacific measures. Our ardent desire, 
however, was frustrated by the Chinese Nineteenth 
Route Army, which led to hostilities. 
" Now the Chinese troops have withdrawn to 
the distance originally demanded by the Japanese 
army, with the consequence that safety of the 
Japanese residents has been insured and peace re-
stored in the Settlement. 
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" I hereby declare that so long as the Chinese 
troops do not resume provocative operations the 
Imperial army will suspend all armed action." 
VII After Cessation of Hostilities 
(A) The Japanese Army 
On March 4 our troops were generally reformed 
on the line of Chiliaokou, Chiating, Nanhsiang and 
Chenju. The Eleventh Division advanced a part of 
its men to Hakkon, 10 kilometres to the northwest 
of Chiating, while a force from the Ninth Division 
was sent forth to Huangtu, 10 kilometres west of 
Nanhsiang, each for the purpose of keeping guard. 
On this day a section of our forces took posses-
sion of the Lion Hill Forts. 
From the outbreak of hostilities to March 17 
the casualties of the Japanese Army were as follows: 
Killed Wounded Total 
9th Division 503 1,274 1,777 
24th Mixed Brigade 151 417 568 
lith Division 64 96 160 
Others 
-
1 1 
Total 718 1,788 2,506 
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Compared with what was experienced in the 
European war where armies assailing strongly 
fortified positions generally suffered a loss of 50 
per cent of their numbers, our damage was remark-
ably smalL While a large measure of credit is due 
to the good work of the Ninth Division and 24th 
Mixed Brigade, the landing of the Eleventh Division 
up the Yangtze, as a restraining movement, had 
good effects upon the decision of the day. 
(B) The Chinese Army 
The Chinese army seems to have withdrawn its 
main force toward Soochow, and a section toward 
Sungkiang, having suffered very heavy damage. It 
is reported that the number of their casualties since 
the outset, together with those who are missing, 
amounted to about 40,000. Small forces are still to 
be found at places near Taitsang and Kunshan, but 
there is no longer a single force of any considerable 
strength east of Soochow. 
(C) Conditions in Shanghai 
In the Settlement of Shanghai the news of our 
victory and the subsequent statement by the Com-
mander of the Expeditionary Army were received 
with great rejoicings by our nationals. On March 4 the 
Japanese shops in Hongkew were all opened. The 
whole male population voluntarily offered their ser-
vices to assist in the work in the rear. Most of 
the Chinese shops in the Settlement were also 
opened. The refugees in the direction of Yangshupu, 
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guarded by the Japanese, began to return to their 
homes. Our army further addressed an assuring 
message to these inhabitants, advising them to return 
to their peaceful pursuits. 
(D) Chinese Propaganda 
The Chinese press throughout the country had 
been filled with information of malicious and often 
ridiculously absurd characters. Chinese recoveries 
of Liuho, Nanhsiang and Chenju; complete annihila· 
tion of the Japanese army; repatriation of the routed 
Japanese troops; death of General Shirakawa and 
consequent hoisting of the national flag at half mast 
at the consulate ; sinking of two Japanese warships-
these are representative of the type of news printed in 
the Chinese newspapers. By propagating such mis-
information the Kuomintang hoped to cover the 
reverses their army had been meeting with on the 
field of battle. They represented the retreats of 
their military forces as voluntary movements made 
necessary through the menaces on the flank, failure 
of the reinforcements to arrive, inferiority in military 
equipment and numerical strength, and all sorts of 
imaginable reasons. 
The public was so misled in some instances 
that they fired off firecrackers in celebration of an 
imagined military success of their soldiers. It may 
also be of some interest to see, for instance, what 
would be the Japanese casualties according to the 
Chinese reports given out from the end of January 
to March 3. By adding up these figures we see 
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that Japan is represented to have lost 33,470 men, 29 
aeroplanes, 6 warships and 15 tanks or armoured 
cars. 
The common people, kept in ignorance, still 
seem to believe in such versions of Chinese military 
successes. In fact, most Chinese seem more favour-
ably disposed toward the Nineteenth Route Army 
than the Nanking Government which, through the 
machinations of the Cantonese political influence, 
was incapacitated to render adequate support to 
the Nineteenth Route Army in hours of need. The 
movement against the Kuomintang still remains 
under the surface. 
VIII. Expeditionary Forces Reduced 
In view of a steady restoration of peace and 
order in and about Shanghai, the Imperial Govern-
ment issued on March 14 an order recalling home 
the Eleventh Division, 24th Mixed Brigade and 
certain special forces. 
On the same occasion our military authorities 
expressed themselves to the following effect : 
" As set forth clearly when our military forces 
were sent to Shanghai, our object in exercising our 
right of self·protection was first to safeguard the 
lives and property of our nationals ... there, and 
secondly to restore peace and order in the Inter-
national Settlement in cooperation with the other 
Powers. In order to attain these objects, the com-
manders of our armed forces there tried all in their 
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power to confine the disturbances to narrow areas 
and settle them by amicable means. But the Chinese 
were not only totally lacking in sincerity but even 
assumed the offensive against us, causing, much to 
our regret, bloodshed and slaughter. But due to 
the august virtue of our Generalissimo and the 
gallant performance of duties by our troops and the 
effective cooperation of our navy, we have achieved 
a glorious victory over the Chinese, inflicting decisive 
damage upon them. The situation having thus been 
securely established, we are now able to withdraw 
a part of our expeditionary forces. 
"However, the general situation there is still 
fraught with serious eventualities. Military bands 
still remain at places, and plain-clothes soldiers are 
still engaged in secret activities of various sorts, so 
that careful vigilance is required. The situation in 
such circumstances is far from reassuring. There 
are also probabilities, if current rumours be true, 
that the Chinese military authorities, with an eye 
to strengthening their positions both internally and 
externally, may after all decide upon a continuation 
of the anti-Japanese agitation or upon instigating 
their people again into armed action with slogans 
of recovering their lost territory." 
Incidentally, our military authorities stated at 
the same time that rumours that our troops had 
been despatched to Formosa in connection with the 
Shanghai trouble were utterly groundless. 
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IX. Conclusion 
Our military expedition, after a series of successful 
operations, has accomplished its primary object. The 
comparatively slow progress seen in the earlier 
stages of the fighting was largely to be accounted 
for by the impediment caused by the topographical 
difficulties of those regions, offering favourable 
condition for defence and proportionately bad condi-
tions for offence. There was also too great a 
difference in the numerical strength of the two 
opposing armies. Our action then was planned so 
as to keep our casualties as low as possible. 
Our men throughout showed superb and resolute 
courage in meeting all situations. In addition to 
the fightings continued practically day and night, 
our men had to experience considerable hardships 
through lack of drinking water, poor supply of food 
through absence of hands to transport, annoyances 
caused by plain-clothes soldiers, and difficulties of 
keeping communication with the rear. 
It must also be noted that the present Shanghai 
incident stood against a background of inglorious 
strifes among the militarist politicians of China. 
The plan for causing disturbances in Shanghai was 
really conceived when the Cantonese were ousted 
in their struggle with Chiang Kai-shek. Schemes had 
subsquently been elaborated. It was the idea 
of these men to instigate the Nineteenth Route 
Army into action to the very end of complicating 
the situation, hoping thereby to place Chiang Kai-
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shek in a political impasse and thus to acquire for 
themselves the ruling power of the whole country. 
These men purposedly propagated misinformation 
as to the strength of our army so as to inspire their 
soldiers and others with proper courage and antago-
nism. However, even with military forces far 
superior in number, the Chinese were forced to 
suffer heavy damage and lose ground in every en-
counter. They are now at pains to shove the 
responsibility for each military failure to anyone 
but themselves. Under the circumstances the 
political situation in China is pregnant with un-
certainties and far from settled. 
Nor can we be blind to the efforts the Chinese 
are now making to draw the League of Nations 
Powers into the Shanghai imbroglio, apparently 
intent upon following their traditional policy of 
playing one Power against another. 
But no matter however the military situation 
in China may change and however her political 
conditions may be aggravated, our army will follow 
its unchanged line, as set forth in the statements 
of the Imperial Government. Needless to say, it 
shall never be our purpose to acquire new interests 
or extend them by armed force, or harbour territorial 
designs. Our action will strictly be confined to the 
exercise of the inviolable rights of national self-
protection, as may be seen from the statement our 
commander made at the first opportunity, ordering 
a cessation of hostilities,-a point which is no doubt 
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clear not only to the Chinese nation but to other 
friendly peoples as well. 
What seems certain about this present question 
of Shanghai is that the settlement of the situation 
is not to be hoped for unless the National Govern· 
ment of China show good faith in extirpating the 
anti·Japanese education and likewise all agitation 
against Japan, awakening fully to the necessity of 
Sino-Japanese friendship. It is our earnest prayer 
that sanity will soon come to rule over China 
that she may see a peaceful and orderly state of 
affairs throughout her land. 
~~------~----
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CORRECTIONS 
Please note the following corrections in "Fightings 
Around Shanghai" (the Herald of Asia Library of Con-
temporary History, No. 8): 
1. On page 2, paragraph 1, line 8, "kilometres" should 
read " metres ". 
2. On page 27, paragraph 1, line 8, "were" should read 
"was''. 
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